

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: CIA Participation in the Activities of the Psychological Strategy Board

1. The problem of CIA participation in the activities of the Psychological Strategy Board, including the deliberations of the staff under this board, have been carefully considered on a continuing basis since the inception of this Board.

2. The Psychological Strategy Board represents potentially one of the most effective elements of the Government to assist CIA in the prosecution of the activities for which it is held responsible in NSC 10/2. This is because it provides a far better media than has heretofore existed for both the resolution of inter-agency problems involving CIA and for insuring adequate coordination of CIA activity with activities of the other Governmental agencies.

3. This factor was early recognized by CIA. CIA participants in the activities of the Board have made every effort to influence its development so as to be of greatest use. It was quickly perceived that for PSB to be effective in resolving inter-agency difficulties and coordinating the parallel efforts of the various Government agencies involved in the field of psychological strategy, two factors must be present in the deliberations of this Board:

a. Its field of endeavor must be broad enough to encompass the entire group of Governmental activities having psychological impact, (i.e., the "broad" interpretation of the Board's functions).

b. It must be permitted to come to grips with the planning problems, but not necessarily the operational aspects, of the agencies whose activities it is coordinating to a far greater extent than has previously been accomplished at this level in the Government.

4. While the introduction of these two elements is particularly important to CIA, in view of the extreme value to PSB to CIA interests, they (particularly the latter) at the same time present a problem of security and propriety which requires special consideration of the nature of CIA's participation in PSB's activities.

5. It is believed that the following courses of action to be undertaken in coordination with the PSB Staff will reduce this security and propriety

problem, to

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problem, to one of only a very slight and very acceptable risk commensurate with other risks taken by this agency.

a. All personnel dealing with PSB problems which have CIA aspects, including the "ad hoc" panels now operating under the Director, should be selected and controlled by the following special measures:

(1) They should all be acceptable from a security standpoint to CIA (and other agencies if requested by them).

(2) The number of such personnel should be kept to an absolute minimum. The same personnel should be reemployed on successive panels or other PSB efforts to the maximum extent practicable.

(3) The principle of interlocking directorates should also be employed to the maximum extent practicable. That is, the same personnel serving on PSB panels, etc., should have similar responsibilities on appropriate committees at other levels of the Government which are concerned with the same problem.

b. Information concerning CIA activity which is reflected in any way at the PSB level should be held to that which is absolutely necessary to permit effectiveness. Early experience with PSB indicates that this need to know may be described as follows:

(1) The most specific information required at the PSB level is probably with respect to what desired action effects are appropriate for assignment to CIA as part of an integrated inter-agency effort. The broad brush treatment in present usage at this level of the Government is, in general, insufficient to permit the understanding of a proper relationship of overt to covert activities. This will, of course, result in reflecting the nature of CIA activities in the PSB. Although in many instances sanitized wording may alleviate the disclosure made in resulting documents, it will, in general, be necessary for the committees involved to understand the factual interpretation of these words.

(2) In the development of plans there is no necessity for detailed disclosure of CIA assets. This may arise at a later date if and when PSB seeks to perform its mission of evaluation. When this becomes a necessity, it is recommended that a covert operations panel be established by PSB and that the members of such panel be

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6. Another problem which has arisen in connection with CIA participation in the PSB is coordination on PSB matters within CIA. Experience has indicated

that agencies

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that agendas for PEB meetings are required well in advance to provide time for the CIA participant on the panel to coordinate with the interested policy, planning, and operations staffs of CIA to assure that the effort of the PEB panel will be fully acceptable to CIA from the standpoint of both policy and capabilities. Furthermore, the CIA participant should be so briefed as to permit him to commit CIA without the necessity for constant reference to higher echelons in CIA.

7. If you agree with this analysis, it is recommended that the enclosed letter be forwarded to

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
KILBOURNE JOHNSTON
Assistant Director For
Policy Coordination

Attachment:

Proposed ltr. to Director, PEB

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